In August of 2021, my dad and I visited the National Museum of American History in Washington, DC. In preparing this post, I tried to look up this exhibit online, and I believe it was called “American Enterprise.” My search revealed that the museum heavily features “diverse” histories:
As you can see, most of the top “topics” deal with the history of a specialized racial or sexual group. When I clicked on “see all topics,” I found the following list:
African American History
American Culture
Asian Pacific American History
Disability History
Infectious Disease History
Innovation
Latino History
Philanthropy
Religion
Restorative History (which is, the website informs us, a movement to make the teaching of history—somehow—even more “inclusive” than it already is and to make it a “Practical Tool for Justice”)
September 11
The Nation We Build Together
Women’s History
Note the heavy emphasis on “woke” topics about the history of “marginalized” groups.
Anyway, one of the displays in American Enterprise—I think it was the “biography wall”—gave short bios of American innovators. I remember being struck by the fact that they featured, alongside people like Thoms Edison and Henry Ford, a display about a Hispanic Californian who created some kind of association for Hispanic-owned businesses (I don’t remember the details, and this may be somewhat off). This man was placed alongside high-level inventors and CEOs. Another room had a large display about the mechanics of early rap music alongside displays about the technological achievements of the digital age (e.g. computers and internet).
I remember being irritated by seeing these things. There is nothing wrong with telling these stories, but doing involved crowding out the “conventional” telling of American history.1 In this case, prioritizing the “voices” of diverse bit players forces the museum to exclude (white male) inventors who were objectively more successful and intelligent. In fact, throughout the museum, white males were downplayed or portrayed as oppressive, even though American history has been driven largely by them. The focus was on the challenges faced by the “marginalized” people, centering and magnifying whatever discrimination the dominant group (i.e. white males) exerted on them. This wasn’t the only focus of the museum, of course, but it stood out.
I tell this story because it illustrates the thesis of this post. One of the promises of 20th century liberalism was that the state would remain neutral between “competing conceptions of the good” (in John Rawl’s phrase). Liberals boast that only their philosophy lets people live in freedom without imposing a particular way of life of everyone. This vision is often framed as a pluralistic, “live and let live” style of tolerance. A key dogma of postliberalism is that such neutrality is impossible. This post shows an important reason why.
Neutrality is impossible, I argue, because people cannot leave each other alone. We cannot leave each other alone because people demand respect, which can only be conferred socially—i.e. by everyone else in society. Receiving respect, moreover, requires that other people affirm our beliefs and values. When spaces are not wide enough to allow for competing or conflicting values, then one set of values or practices must be placed higher all others. Sometimes, only adherents of a single set of non-competing worldviews can be “respected” simultaneously, while adherents of worldviews which contradict the dominant set of worldviews must live without respect.
People and Groups Demand Respect
A central component of liberalism is “individualism,” the idea that everyone should be treated as an individual and not as a member of a group (like “Jews” or “Capitalists”). People in individualistic societies fancy themselves to be self-sufficient, with little need for other people. Individuals, on this model, are left free to fashion their lives and social circles as they see fit. America’s growing epidemic of loneliness is a grim confirmation of both the pervasiveness and inescapability of this cultural attitude.
This view of human nature is a myth. In reality, the psychological health of human beings depends, to an almost pathetic degree, on the approval of other people. We crave the good opinion of our friends, our bosses, and even strangers. Many things we do, from the way we dress to how we talk, are aimed at gaining approval from others. When others do not match the (usually high) opinion we have of ourselves, we feel “disrespected.”
The desire for respect applies to both individuals and group. Individuals crave the approval of a parent, partner, or family member, but they may also crave “fame” or “honor” by gaining recognition in politics, business, or entertainment. Groups of people desire to be recognized mainly at the societal level. Humans regularly divide themselves, more or less spontaneously, into “identity groups” based on observable characteristic such as language, culture, ethnicity, religion, ideology, class, etc. This self-division forms the basis of “identity politics.” While this term has only recently gained traction, the concept is as old as politics itself.
Francis Fukuyama views many political conflicts in modern democracies as fundamentally a series of struggles by competing groups for “recognition” or “respect.”2 Identifying parts of human nature using ancient Greek words, he argues that thymos (θυμός) or “spiritedness,” the part of us which becomes angry or passionate, can manifest in a desire for either megalothymia (μεγαλοθυμία) or isothymia (ἰσοθυμία). Megalothymia is the desire to be recognized as superior, while isothymia is the desire to be recognized as an equal. Some humans are satisfied only by being recognized as superior, but most people demand only be treated as an equal.
Alongside thymos, Fukuyama argues that modern people are uniquely driven by a concern for their “identity.” The concept of “identity” originates, he thinks, in the Protestant Reformation’s emphasis on personal conscience, and was secularized by Rousseau. (Carl Truman provides a similar but fuller and better account of the rise of identity politics.)3 Identity involves a distinction between one’s “outer” (external) self and one’s “inner” self. People want public recognition of their “authentic,” inner selves.
I know a lot of conservatives hate Fukuyama, but he’s on to something here. The language of thymos helps to explain political passions. The idea of “rational man” is a fantasy. Postliberals need to accommodate groups claims into their political theory. Postliberal politics, for instance, tend to prioritize the idea of the nation as a unifying feature of healthy politics.
The problem is that Fukuyama thinks doubling down on liberalism will solve the problems of identity politics. “Modern liberal democracies promise and largely deliver a minimal degree of equal respect, embodied in individual rights, the rule of law, and the franchise,” he claims—the main problem is that liberalism fails to guarantee that “people in a democracy will be equally respected in practice.”4 Fukuyama recommends greater “inclusion” of “marginalized” groups. Conflicting groups can be managed by creating “identities that are broader and more integrative.” In particular, Fukuyama says, we need to “promote creedal national identities build around the foundational ideas of modern liberal democracy,” which “has its own culture.” In this way, the “narrow” categories of religion, nation, and caste are displaced by universal or cosmopolitan conceptions of the self and the world. He explicitly supports a single mode of education for all and rejects religious private schools.5 Immigration should be welcomed so long as they assimilate to liberal democratic culture.
The Impossibility of Mutual Respect: A Schema
Unfortunately, the problem of thymos is worse than Fukuyama recognizes. A “systemic” conflict exists, in some instances, between people’s desires to be respected and liberal democracy’s commitment to pluralism and toleration. To be more precise, it is impossible to create mutual respect in restricted and/or public spaces, where the claims of different groups are incompatible or cannot be met simultaneously.
To illustrate this idea, I created a typology of spaces.
Restricted spaces cannot be “expanded” to encompass a greater number of groups, positions, awards, viewpoints, etc. Restriction can derive from limited space, limited time, or limited resources.
Unrestricted spaces are capacious enough to allow for a variety of different and even competing goods, services, or opinions.
Public spaces contains element (such as rules, social practices, or physical objects) that must be used by everyone in them.
Private spaces are spaces where one or more people associate voluntarily to perform something in common, while excluding all others.
Here is a schema of the four kinds of spaces:
These categories are fuzzy. An art festival cannot, of course, display literally any or all art, and so is not truly “unrestricted,” but such festivals generally accomodate a wide variety of artists. Most social media sites have “content moderation” rules of varying stringency—conservatives often consider them too restrictive—but within these limits people can expresses a multitude of opinions. The movements toward “polyamory” and polygamy attempt to make sex and marriage less “restricted.” But the categories hold up in general. A museum, an art festival, and an art store are very different things, even if they all have paintings.
Conflict erupts whenever contradictory ideas or systems simultaneously try to inhabit the same restricted space. In such cases, whoever controls the space is forced to choose which groups will receive respect and which groups will not. The deepest conflicts occur in shared and restricted, or “political,” spaces (the top-left box), but conflict can take place in “non-political” spaces where people have to share something in common. The following is a random and incomplete list of shared spaces, with an explanation of the source of conflict.
“To Each Zir Own”: Examples of Conflicting Values in Shared Spaces
I will expand on the chart above by providing illustrations that show the impossibility of achieving universal respect.
First, consider linguistic rules. On a personal level, I have experienced judgment on the issue of what to call people older than oneself. I grew up calling older people “Mr. (or Mrs.) Last Name.” Many other people—probably a majority, but not a large one—call older people “Mr. (or Ms.) First Name.” Some of these people treat my naming practices as bizarre and inexplicable. They openly speculate about how someone could name others the way I did growing up, strongly implying by their tone and wording that there is something freakish about it. Even though this isn’t a very “important” issue, people care about this stuff. I feel belittled when people react to my way, and they clearly feel uncomfortable with my way.
What about Black Vernacular English (BVE)? When I was a professor, I taught using Standard English. I unconsciously expected the students to speak and write Standard English, not BVE, in class and in their assignments. I didn’t knowingly penalize anyone for speaking or writing in Black Vernacular English, but it is harder for them to keep up with the readings and lectures, and I’m sure I marked them down for writing style and clarity.6 The same goes for foreign language speakers or speakers of other regional dialects. I cannot see how the classroom can be made “unrestricted” with regard to language. One dialect has to be given priority over the others, and almost everyone chooses Standard English. I imagine that speakers of regional dialects, like BVE, feel “out of place” and “marginalized.”
The paradigmatic case of linguistic conflict, of course, is the debate over transgender language. What pronouns should be used to refer to “transgender” people? Is that a “pregnant woman” or a “birthing person?” Imagine a social conservative who rejects gender theory conversing with or about a male person who claims to be a female (a so-called “transwoman”). Suppose the social conservative does not want to use the latter’s preferred pronouns. In this case, one person’s views must be given priority over the other’s. It is very difficult not to use pronouns to refer to someone, and so one is forced to choose what to say. The choice reflects a public commitment for or against gender theory. To use a transgender person’s preferred pronouns is to affirm—at least publicly—that one believes that sex is a social construct that can be changed at will. To do the opposite is to deny that belief.
Either way, society inevitably establishes social norms on the issue. If society sides against the social conservative, he or she likely will feel belittled and resentful. Society will communicate that he or she has “bigoted” or “outdated” or “hateful” attitudes, causing further emotional pain. He or she may be shunned by others or asked to leave. If the social conservative is allowed to refuse to use the preferred pronouns, then the transgender person will be belittled and offended. Transgender people often frame this sense of hurt by saying that social conservatives are trying to “erase” them or “deny their existence.”
“Mere words,” it turns out, can cause real-world fights. A dramatic illustration of this occurred in December 2018, when a hapless store clerk repeatedly referred to a so-called transwoman as “sir.” The clerk’s behavior appeared to be an automatic and inadvertent response to the transgender person’s obviously masculine appearance, tall stature, and broad shoulders. Regardless, the latter responded with (stereotypically masculine) anger: swearing, shouting at the clerk to call him “ma’am,” knocking over a display stand, and asking for a corporate complaint number. (Okay, to be fair, that last one sounds like a Karen.) Conservative commentators dubbed him “Macho Ma’am Tranny Savage,” a play on the popular wrestler Macho Man Randy Savage.
Another example where compromise on values is impossible involves the accommodation of religious law in universities and schools. In January of 2023, a liberal arts professor at Hamline University in Minnesota, Erika López Prater, was fired for showing a centuries-old picture of Muhammad. She had warned students in the syllabus and provided advance notice on the day of class, so that offended people could leave the room. However, depictions of sentient beings, and especially of the prophet Muhammad, are strictly forbidden in traditional Islamic law, and Muslim students took offense. Some students called her actions “Islamophobic.” University President Fayneese Miller, in a letter to the student body, wrote that “respect for the observant Muslim students in that classroom should have superseded academic freedom.” Prater has sued, and President Miller recently announced that she will retire next year—possibly in response to the backlash.
The central point is that whoever controls a political space must prioritize some people or values over others in that space. Either the transgender person feels “misgendered” or the person objecting to transgenderism is characterized as a bigot. Either you allow professors to show pictures of Mohammed, or you fire them. Compromise is impossible, and someone will walk away offended or disrespected.
Examples of Imposed Respect in Unrestricted Spaces
Unlike restricted or political spaces, other spaces can accommodate diversity without disrespecting others. Contrast the above examples with, say, restaurants or soft drinks. There are thousands of restaurants in the United States, of every possible description. Americans don’t have to agree on “Chick-fil-a vs. McDonalds” or “Coke vs. Pepsi”—although conflicts can arise when a family or team must choose to eat at a particular location. (My wife, an Atlanta girl, won’t drink anything other than Coke and Cherry Coke.) More generally, preferences of “taste” or “style” can vary without causing undue conflict. “To each his own.”
Yet, even here, it is surprising how unreceptive to diversity human beings are. It is routine for people to judge other people’s character or aesthetic taste based on the type of music they listen to. Adherents of different bands or sports stars argue more than is necessary.
More broadly, there are many ways in which liberal democracy chooses, voluntarily, to disrespect certain people by forcing them to publicly affirm something that they find offensive or wrong—or punishing them for affirming socially conservative beliefs—even in “non-shared” or private spaces.
Here are a few examples:
In 2014, Mozilla CEO, Brendan Eich was forced to resign because in 2008 he had contributed $1,000 to a ballot proposition opposing same-sex marriage in California.
In 2005, Emily Brooker, a graduate student at Missouri State University, refused to participate in a class project that required the students to write and sign a collective letter in support of gay adoption and send it to the state legislature. When Brooker refused to sign, she “was called before a college ethics committee on Dec. 16, where she was questioned for two hours by faculty members. She alleges they asked her questions such as ‘Do you think gays and lesbians are sinners?’ and ‘Do you think I am a sinner?’ She says she was also asked if she could help gay and lesbian people in social work situations.” They accused her of violating the Standards of Essential Functioning in Social Work Education.
In 2016, Andrew Cash was expelled from Missouri State University’s master’s program in counseling because he would not agree to counsel gay couples, though he would counsel gay people individually.
Philadelphia Flyers defenseman Ivan Provorov was castigated for refusing to wear an LGBTQ inclusion jersey for the team’s “Pride Night.” When asked, Provorov said: “I respect everybody, and I respect everybody’s choices. My choice is to stay true to myself and my religion,” which is Russian Orthodox Christian. While his coach said he “respects” Provorov for “being true to himself,” and the NHL has not taken action against him, he has faced backlash. The Flyers organization quickly announced their commitment to “inclusivity,” many people have called for Provorov to be “held accountable,” and TV analyst E.J. Hradek even suggested that he should go back to Russia. (Who knew progressives could be nativists.)
Nondiscrimination law is being used to try to force people who dissent from homosexual behavior to place adopted babies with same-sex couples, to provide services for same-sex weddings, and so on.
These incidents highlight a growing cultural trend toward demanding that people openly and loudly “affirm” LGBTQ (or indigenous, or black, or whatever) people in their public expression and identities. Transgenderism, in particular, goes the furthest, making even more intrusive and less avoidable demands than prior movements did. Progressive gender theory enforces a redefinition of basic terms (like “man” and “feminine hygiene products”) and a new set of practices regarding pronouns. Linguistic norms are a shared practice that requires coordination. People regularly find themselves in situations where they must refer to someone who they perceive to be a man as “she” or “Miss” (or vice versa), lest they cause a scene.
(As an aside, embracing language consistent with a particular theory of gender is likely to shape public perceptions in favor of that theory. Conservatives who agree, out of courtesy or cowardice, to use people’s preferred pronouns are therefore playing with fire. If you call a woman a man long enough, you will start to believe it.)
In this sense, the LGBT regime is more oppressive even than the traditionalist moral regime that reigned before the sexual revolution. Back then, it was dangerous to be “out” as gay: one might be harassed, and one would certainly lose friends and job opportunities. But gay people didn’t have to publicly oppose same-sex marriage or “affirm” traditional Christianity as an identity. So long as they remained “in the closet,” they could go about their business without being required to do anything that would violate their conscience.7
Social conservatives in today’s climate, by contrast, have nowhere to “hide.” Not only do they face social ostracization and loss of job opportunities if they publicly affirm their beliefs, but often they are required to affirm socially progressive beliefs (e.g. linguistic rules based on transgender theory) in ordinary situations where such affirmation is not absolutely necessary. If “cancellation” for violating these norms becomes routine, then our society will become very oppressive indeed.
Conclusion
This post is already too long, so I’ll stop. I plan to follow up this post with a Part II about how postliberal conservatives should handle each of the four shared spaces outlined above. There is a way to avoid neutrality without courting offense, one that is less insistent that the reigning orthodoxy.
I found an article criticizing the display for too great an emphasis on diverse minor players. The museum responded with this piece.
Francis Fukuyama, Identity: The Demand for Dignity and the Politics of Resentment (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2018).
Carl R. Trueman, The Rise and Triumph of the Modern Self: Cultural Amnesia, Expressive Individualism, and the Road to Sexual Revolution (Wheaton: Crossway, 2020).
Fukuyama, Identity, xiii.
Fukuyama, Identity, 172.
I only had a couple of BVE speakers, probably because people who speak BVE rarely go to college. They were older black students at Eastern Michigan University, near Detroit. Their work didn’t meet my normal standards, but I passed them with C grades because they had positive attitudes, tried hard, and, at their age, the stakes didn’t seem very high.
To be fair, blacks in the Jim Crow South couldn’t escape scrutiny in this way.