The Meritocracy Trap and Postliberal Conservatism

Part II

In the last post, I reviewed The Meritocracy Trap, by Daniel Markovits. This book is an attack on economic inequality in America, which Markovits believes is harming both elite workers and ordinary people. I tend to agree, but he is a leftist, and so he misses some important considerations.

The Good Stuff

There was a lot to like about The Meritocracy Trap. Markovits provides an incisive critique of the modern economy and how it aggravates class divisions and leaves many behind. His thesis seems more intuitively plausible than Piketty’s thesis that elite wealth derives from rents, which he claims are more profitable than wages. If that were true, then why do the elites work so many hours, as Markovits documents? The elite class today are not, by and large, privileged children of wealthy parents, but rather hard-working executives, innovators, or professionals (even if they come from money).

I also think Markovits explains well the elite’s disdain for ordinary workers. He posits that, since merit and hard work are the source of the elite’s wealth and power, they must look down on the economic “losers” as somehow not skilled or hard-working enough. This move is necessary for psychological reasons, both to reconcile the elite’s wealth with its commitment to egalitarianism and to preserve its honor in face of criticism. But the elite’s perspective ignores the structural features of the economy that weaken opportunities for most people.

A third useful aspect of The Meritocracy Trap is its fascinating portrayal of the U.S. economy in the mid-twentieth century. People growing up today don’t know how things used to be. There used to be many mid-skilled jobs, such as loan officers, that allowed people to make a moderate living without overworking or chasing elite creditials. These have largely been displaced by super-skilled workers, computers, or robots. Markovits’ picture of a healthy economy provides an aspirational model for policy-makers today, even though he doesn’t do enough to flesh out how to return to that era.

An Incomplete Analysis

Now, on the to the criticism. One key weakness of the book is its incomplete and biased argumentation. Simply put, Markovits cherry-picks his data due to his leftist bias. Here are some examples.

1. Immigration

Like most left-wing treatments of inequality, The Meritocracy Trap portrays the years 1945-1970 as a “golden age” when inequality was at its lowest level. Unions were strong, factories were full, and wages were high. But this was also a period of low immigration and little trade competition. The Immigration Act of 1924 dramatically lowered immigration rates (which had been low since 1914 anyway) and gave more spots to immigrants from countries with cultures similar to the WASP majority. This fostered an environment in which native workers didn’t have to compete with cheap labor. Markovits ignores immigration and its role in perpetuating inequality.

2. Trump

Markovits obviously loathes Donald Trump, Trump voters, and populism. Like many liberals, he seems to understand the populist impulse as a backlash against economic inequality and elite snobbishness. This is true as far as it goes, but it ignores the cultural (nationalist) angle of Trumpism. Markovits is content to blame populism and nativism on meritocracy and seems incapable of seeing any merit to traditionalism or nationalism.

3. Democratic Party Bias

Markovits is conventionally leftist across the board. When he gives examples of how government serves the needs of the elite class, he tends to pick “Republican” examples, such as tax cuts. He states that Johnson’s “war on poverty” lowered poverty, and seems incurious about any possible side-effects, such as welfare dependency, harm to family structures, or overspending (102). He mentions how much money the Koch brothers spent in 2016 elections, but not anyone else (52).

4. Affirmative Action

Markovits characterizes DEI and affirmative action as attempts to purify “elite institutions of nonmeritocratic biases” (273). This framing seems to assume, absurdly, that elite institutions are currently biased against non-whites and non-males. He ignores how utterly central anti-meritocratic hiring practices have become to schools and businesses, and how much these harm the lives of white and Asian Americans.

5. Big Tech

The book seems to ignore the threat posed by Big Tech to free speech, focusing instead on how political donations capture politicians (51-54). He ignores ideological bias overall and fails to interrogate institutions captured by the Left.

Deeper Critiques

The above critiques were somewhat minor. But there are several deeper weaknesses with Markovits’s point of view.

Nature

First, The Meritocracy Trap assumes that genes have nothing to do with success. Talent is not “natural,” he insists, but “nurtured,” principally through education (259). Higher outputs at elite schools are the product of money spent, and nothing else (cf. 25-26). He notes a correlation between education spending and academic output. But this doesn’t prove that higher spending causes better educational results. We have been spending more and more money on low-performing school districts over recent decades, with scant results. It seems that “poor” school districts have less money because they are located in less wealthy areas. But these areas are less wealth but less wealthy people live there, and the people who live there are less wealthy primarily because of genetics and culture. I don’t have time to defend this proposition, but it seems obvious to me that humans are not a “blank slate” that can achieve anything under the right circumstances. Just as with athleticism, musical ability, or eyesight, a person’s intelligence—and other factors associated with economic success—is limited by his genes. By ignoring the role of family, culture, and genes, Makovits implies (and sometimes outright argues) that economic inequality is produced solely by differences in “inputs” such as good schools. This framing places the “fault” for inequality on the shoulders of society, since society could easily spend more money on schools in low-performing districts. This is a classic progressive move that ignores the fact that huma inequality is hardwired in many cases.

Conservatives are better equipped to develop political philosophies that take account of this inherent inequality. To be fair, some on the far right, following Nietzsche and others, disregard those who have less, seeing them as inferior and unvaluable. This is incompatible with a Christian worldview. My own postliberal natural law perspective has more in common with Patrick Deneen’s “Aristo-populism.” Societies need an elite, and it isn’t wrong for some people to have more power or prominence than others. It’s natural and ineradicable. But the elite needs to be fashioned, checked, and trained to care for the common good and for those who are incapable of becoming elite themselves. It isn’t easy to make the elite do this, of course but it’s a better strategy than trying to tear down all inequality.

Hyper-Focus on Economic Equality

Another deeper weakness is that Makovits only appears to be interested in reducing economic inequality. His moral vision is limited to seeing differences in income between people, and he recognizes and pursue no other good. For this reason, The Meritocracy Trap is not a blueprint for how to achieve a happy or flourishing society. He doesn’t investigate the basis of human flourishing. He is locked in the modern consumeristic mindset that sees money as the source of all ills or goods.

In the end, it’s hard to tell what Makovits’s overall message is. Is he pro- or anti-consumption? Is it better to be middle class? Why get rich if you have to work so hard? If the elite are worked too hard and very unhappy, then why does it matter if they get paid a lot?

In short, Markovits neglects the question of the end or goal of life. He seems to assume life is about pleasure. The book feels spiritually dead. This leads him to ignore bigger questions of how work should relate to the “good life.” Is money the end of life? Why isn’t a middle-class job enough?

Apart from inequality, the only topic discussed by Markovits is honor. Markovits helpfully exposes how the meritocratic system gives honor to the wealthy (they worked hard to “earn” it) and removes it from the poor (there must be something wrong with them for not “achieving”). But this move still raises more questions. If work is only good because it is honorable, should we keep it honorable and extend it to all? Or should we try to not make it honorable so that all people can have honor? Should people without work seek it? Why not live a life of indolence?

Disrespect Towards Virtue

My central criticism of The Meritocracy Trap may seem strange: it is blind to the virtues of aristocracy. To be fair, he seems suspicious of virtue in general. Virtually all purported virtues, he claims, cannot be called a “natural” or “necessary” to “human excellence” (264). Virtues are like a baseball pitcher’s skill at pitching: they are valuable only in the context of an artificial and ultimately meaningless set of rules (264). Virtues are context-dependent and become “worthless (or worse)” when divorced from their context (264).

Still, Makovits saves his strongest words for the “virtues” of aristocrats. His unmitigated disdain for the leisured class comes across clearly and repeatedly. “Once, lazy aristocrats produced little or nothing at all,” he intones (xi). More precisely, the book relentlessly mocks the aristocrat’s pretention to virtue. The “bourgeois revolutions” “unmasked” the aristocratic conception of virtue as “at best ridiculous and in fact a sham” (268). “What is conventionally called merit is actually an ideological conceit, constructed to launder a fundamentally unjust allocation of advantage” (268).

I am teaching an independent study class this semester on Northanger Abbey by Jane Austen. As a prelude to reading this novel, we looked at the social background of regency-era England (i.e. A.D. 1780-1830). And I admit, it’s hard not to have a certain distaste for the English nobility during this time. They seemed to exist only to make complicated rules of social behavior that excluded others, to walk around and make small talk, and to find someone rich or high-born to marry. It’s no wonder they were superseded by industrial capitalists during the nineteenth century.

Nevertheless, Markovits’s analysis ignores the role of leisure in providing for the cultivation of higher virtues that most people cannot access. There is a long tradition in the history of philosophy that you need “leisure,” or time to devote yourselves to pursuits “higher” than moneymaking, to become virtuous. Plato thought that the rulers should be philosopher-kings who could focus on understanding the universe. Aristotle believed that the ruling class should be cultured aristocrats who dedicate their lives to contemplation, politics, friendship, and performing virtuous activities. Think of all the great works of art produced during aristocratic eras. Men like Alexander of Macedon, Julius Caesar, and Napoleon—for all their faults—demonstrated bravery, willingness to forgo pleasure, and patriotism. At its best, the aristocracy provided stable, honorable leadership.

Modern democratic societies, by contrast, are based on a “lowest common denominator” approach to ethics and politics. Pop music lacks substance. People care about consumption. Honor is based on “likes” on viral social media posts. There are many advantages to this system. Capitalism has created enormous wealth and technological innovation that has improved life in many ways. But a fair assessment would show the advantages of both sides. This is what Alexis de Tocqueville does in Democracy in America.

Conclusion

In sum, The Meritocracy Trap has valuable insights for postliberal conservatives. It should be read to better understand the meritocratic system as well as how the economy worked before the recent dominance of “super-skilled” workers. An economy with fewer millionaires and more stable, middle-class incomes is one that conservatives should welcome. But beware the philosophical baggage that accompanies Markvots’s critique.